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Large banks often sell part of their loan portfolio in the form of collateralized debt obligations 
(CDO) to investors. In this paper we raise the question whether credit asset securitization 
affects the cyclicality (or commonality) of bank equity values. The commonality of bank 
equity values reflects a major component of systemic risks in the banking market, caused by 
correlated defaults of loans in the banks’ loan books. 
Our simulations take into account the major stylized fact of CDO transactions, the non-
proportional nature of risk sharing that goes along with tranching. We provide a theoretical 
framework for the risk transfer through securitization that builds on a macro risk factor and an 
idiosyncratic risk factor, allowing an identification of the types of risk that the individual 
tranche holders bear. This allows conclusions about the risk positions of issuing banks after 
risk transfer. 
Building on the strict subordination of tranches, we first evaluate the correlation properties 
both within and across risk classes. We then determine the effect of securitization on the 
systematic risk of all tranches, and derive its effect on the issuing bank’s equity beta. The 
simulation results show that under plausible assumptions concerning bank reinvestment 
behaviour and capital structure choice, the issuing intermediary’s systematic risk tends to rise. 
We discuss the implications of our findings for financial stability supervision. 
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Securitization of loan assets has become a common instrument of bank risk man-
agement. According to [10], a survey published by the European Central Bank
in 2004, about 8-15% of overall assets of large, international banks, have been
subject to a securitization transaction. Many observers, such as J.P. Morgan
(2004), believe the market for asset backed securities (ABS) to grow rapidly
in the next couple of years. What is the impact of securitizations on the risk
exposure of the issuing institutions? In particular, how are commercial banks
aﬀected that hold large volumes of loans on their balance sheets and that engage
in securitizing them?
The answers to these questions are not obvious at all. According to Green-
baum and Thakor (1987), credit securitization allows a bank to reduce its risk
exposure, and to increase diversiﬁcation in the economy. In the model of Duﬃe
and Gârleanu (2001), securitizations improve liquidity and induce a positive
overall market value eﬀect. However, the eﬀective risk transfer from a bank’s
balance sheet is limited by moral hazard problems. Allen and Gale (2004) ar-
gue that, for incomplete markets, credit risk transfer may in fact increase risk
concentration rather than risk diversiﬁcation, thereby raising overall systemic
risk. While risk transfer has often been cited as a major driver of ABS market
development, we will show below that in a typical CLO and CDO transaction
(i.e. collateralized loan obligations, collateralized debt obligations), risk transfer
is rather limited, irrespective of the impressive size of the issues. The key to
understanding risk transfer in structured transactions, such as ABS and CDOs,
lies in the non-proportional sharing of risk. The tranching of claims, and the
application of the subordination principle, lead to a reshuﬄing of risk in the
portfolio. Typically, tail risk is being transfered, while non-tail risk is retained
by the issuing bank. This is particularly true for asset pools that are subject
to moral hazard, such that retention of the most junior tranche, the ﬁrst loss
piece, serves as a bonding and signaling device (DeMarzo, 2005). Tranching
and securitization therefore alters, or may alter, three aspects of the issuer’s
risk position. First, it truncates the loss rate distribution. Second, it aﬀects
the correlation between on-balance sheet assets and, third, it may change the
systematic risk of the company, its exposure against market-wide risk factors.
In this paper we address all three consequences of asset securitization. We
model a bank that repeatedly securitizes its loan portfolio, while retaining the
ﬁrst loss piece, and that reinvests the proceeds by lending to customers. Given
the risk characteristics of the loan portfolio, how does securitization change the
basic properties of the bank’s remaining loan book, i.e. its loss rate distribution?
what are the correlations between the retained asset portions and the remaining
asset on the balance sheet? Furthermore, how can the risks be characterized
that are transfered oﬀ the balance sheet, and on to the buyers’ books? Are they
mostly systematic or rather company-speciﬁc, i.e. of an unsystematic nature?
Finally, how is the dependence of bank equity values on a macroeconomic factor
aﬀected, does it increase or decrease?
Our analysis is of major importance for investors and for regulators. In line
2with Das et al. (2004), investors will price structured ﬁnance products, like
senior or mezzanine tranches of a CDO transaction, by looking at the amount
of systematic default risk that they carry. For this purpose, systematic default
risk has to be estimated. For regulators, risk shifting between banks and capital
markets is relevant since it may aﬀect the required capital base of individual
banks and, even more importantly, it may aﬀect the exposure of the banking
system at large vis-à-vis macroeconomic risks, see Andersen et al. (2004).
The analysis relies on a two-stage procedure: First, the loss distribution of
the underlying portfolio has to be determined. Subsequently, the loss distribu-
tion is allocated to tranches, representing claims of diﬀerent seniority on the
underlying portfolio. We apply a Monte Carlo simulation to model the loss
distributions for portfolios of bank loans. For tranching, we apply cut-oﬀ values
represented by maximum default probabilities allowed for each tranche. In prac-
tice, these values are indicated by rating agencies. The data are then used to
describe the correlation property between tranches of diﬀerent seniority and/or
diﬀerent underlying asset pools. Our asset value model allows to disentangle the
eﬀects of an economy-wide risk factor from risks associated with an industry, or
a particular company.
The results show that, among tranches of diﬀerent transactions with the
same credit quality (intra-rating correlations), the most senior tranches have
the highest correlation coeﬃcient.
Second, the correlation between tranche performance and the realization of
the macro factor is monotonically related to the degree of subordination. In
particular, senior tranches have a low systematic risk, while junior tranches
show high systematic risk.
These ﬁndings allow to asses the eﬀect of securitizations on the systematic
risk of bank equity and, ultimately, on the systemic risk of the banking industry
as a whole. We argue that, as the banks apply themselves to the securitization
of individual loan books, they will most likely increase their systemic expo-
sure, rather than reduce it. This, in turn, will contribute to an increase in the
probability of banking crises.
The paper is structured as follows: First, we describe how CDOs can be
modeled. We present the model setup, based on a ﬁrm-value model, and dis-
cuss the implementation based on Monte Carlo simulation. Second, we look at a
single transaction and investigate which risks are transfered from the underlying
loan portfolio to tranches as part of securitization. Third, we turn to the level
of individual institutions. We infer the consequences of securitization for the
risk positions of typical banks and examine the beneﬁts of loan portfolio diver-
siﬁcation in the context of securitization. We also derive how bank equity betas
change after banks securitize their loan portfolios. Fourth, at the level of the
overall economy, we examine the interaction of banks and the consequences of
securitization for systemic risk. In the concluding section we discuss the impli-
cations of our ﬁndings for ﬁnancial stability supervision and risk management.
32M o d e l i n g C D O s
In this section we will analyze the risk charactristics of asset backed securities
and related ﬁnancial instruments1. We construct a simple tool that allows us
to portray the loss distribution of asset portfolios, and of any tranche that is
derived from the same underlying portfolio.
2.1 Model setup
We apply a ﬁrm-value model to capture the occurrence of obligor default. More
precisely, we apply a structural one-factor correlated default model. The driving
factor is a market factor, and company value is modeled as the interplay of the
market factor and a company speciﬁc, idiosyncratic risk factor. This market
model approach is the model of choice in most corporate ﬁnance applications.
We model company value Vn,t of each obligor n ∈ {1,2,...,N} at any time
t before maturity as being driven by a generalized macroeconomic factor Y M
t
that is common to all securities, and an idiosyncratic component  n,t:
Vn,t =
q
ρM
n Y M
t +
q
1 − ρM
n  n,t (1)
with Y M
t ∼ Φ(0,1),a n d n,t ∼ Φ(0,1). Thereby, we obtain correlated
asset values of obligors. In case the sensitivities
p
ρM
n of ﬁrm values to the
macroeconomic risk factor are the same for all obligors n,t h e nρM
n corresponds
to the mutual correlation coeﬃcient for all assets.2
Obligor n is assumed to default if at any time t the value Vn,t of its assets
lies below the exogenously given default boundary Dn,i . e .Vn,t <D n. Vn,t is
assumed to be normally distributed and is standardized such that Vn,t ∼ Φ(0,1).
There is a simple relation linking every default boundary Dn to a particular
default probability pn:
Dn = Φ−1 (pn). (2)
1Asset backed securities are structured ﬁnancial instruments that share two basic features:
the pooling of underlying ﬁnancial claims, and their tranching into a set of bonds, diﬀerentiated
by the degree of subordination. See Jorion or Fabozzi for institutional details.
2A more general model setup allowing for both inter- and intra-industry correlation
could include, besides the market factor, orthogonal industry factors Y
j
t for industries
j ∈ {1,2,...,J}. The company value of each obligor in industry j can be modeled as:
V
j
n,t =
p
ρM
n Y M
t +
q
ρ
j
nY
j
t +
q
1 − ρM
n − ρ
j
n n,t,w i t hY M
t ∼ Φ(0,1), Y
j
t ∼ Φ(0,1),a n d
 t
n ∼ Φ(0,1). We assume that securities within industries are driven by a factor Y
j
t that is
orthogonal to Y M
t and speciﬁc for that particular industry, i.e. Cov
³
Y i
t ,Y
j
t
´
=0for i 6= j.
Thereby, we obtain correlated asset values of obligors within the same industry, with corre-
lation coeﬃcient ρ
j
n for industry j. The chosen representation also allows for inter-industry
correlations, captured by ρM
n . This approach is quite general and accounts both for both
inter- and intra-industry correlations. Its structure encompasses the approaches commonly
applied by major rating agencies, which rely on a one factor model for each industry and zero
inter-industry correlation. Thus, it reduces to the classical market model if industry-speciﬁc
risk is zero, while it reduces to the agency model if only the industry-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n th a s
explanatory power.
4Usually, a fraction of the notional amount can be recovered in case of default.
Let ψn denote the recovery rate and θn t h ee x p o s u r es i z eo fs e c u r i t yn. Portfolio
loss is given as the sum of individual loan losses. We deﬁne the portfolio default
rate PDRas the present value of portfolio loss divided by the net present value
of all promised payments until maturity:
PDR=
PN
n=1 1{Tn>τn} · θn ·
¡
Fn · (1 − ψn) · e−rτn + Cn,τn,Tn · e−rTn¢
PN
n=1 θn · (Fn + Cn,0,Tn) · e−rTn
, (3)
where 1{Tn>τn} is an indicator function taking the value one if security
n defaults during its lifetime and zero otherwise. Tn represents maturity of
security n,a n dτn is the time of default. Fn denotes the redemption value
and Cn,sn,tn represents the present value at time tn of all coupon payments for
security n paid in the time interval [sn,t n]. All payoﬀsa r ed i s c o u n t e dw i t h
interest rate r.
The applied ﬁrm value model (Eq. 1) is suitable for a simulation exercise.
2.2 Model implementation
In the implementation, we do not need to apply simplifying assumptions to de-
termine the loss distribution of the underlying portfolio. Instead, we are able to
fully proﬁt from the Monte Carlo Simulation procedure. Analytical approaches
often rely on limiting assumptions, e.g. that the portfolio is composed of an inﬁ-
nite number of securities with identical characteristics. Thus, analytical models
to some extent may be suitable for sensitivity analyses, but Monte Carlo Simu-
lation is more appropriate for real-world applications. All individual securities
in the portfolio can be accounted for by their speciﬁc exposure size, recovery
rate, default probability, and maturity. Furthermore, Monte Carlo Simulation
allows to diﬀerentiate between obligors and individual securities. The occur-
rence of joint obligor defaults is modeled by accounting for the sensitivity of
each individual obligor to the common factor.
The loss distribution is simulated in 5 steps: First, a realization of the macro
factor is simulated until maturity. Subsequently, default scenarios are generated
for all individual obligors in the portfolio. Default occurs, if the simulated ﬁrm
value of an obligor, based on realizations of the macro factor and an idiosyncratic
term, falls below the default boundary. The default boundaries correspond to
cut-oﬀ values denoting the maximum default probability allowed for a tranche
of a particular seniority. In the third step, individual loan losses are obtained
by applying a recovery rate to loan default. Fourth, portfolio loss is given as
the sum of realized individual loan losses. This corresponds to one realization
in the simulation. Fifth, many simulation runs yield the loss distribution of the
entire portfolio.
The loss distribution depends on various input factors that may be grouped
into three categories: Individual loan components, portfolio components, and
additional CDO features. Individual loan components comprise maturity, credit
5quality, and credit migration probability, and expected recovery rate at default.
Portfolio components comprise the sensitivities of the individual loans to the
common factor, portfolio diversiﬁcation, and individual obligor concentration.
Furthermore, in practice, CDO loan portfolios present additional complications
as they are dynamic portfolios with various restrictions concerning asset replen-
ishment over the lifetime of the issue. The implementation applied in this paper
accounts for single issuer default as well as portfolio characteristics, which are
the focus of the investigation.
3 Risk allocation to tranches
3.1 Individual tranche characteristics
We now investigate the nature of risk transfer from the underlying portfolio
to tranches. This is at the heart of structured ﬁnance products, pooling of
individual risks in order to reallocate these risks to investors. The transfer of
risks is non-proportional, or non-linear, due to the principle of subodination of
tranches. To estimate the resulting risk allocation we rely on a Monte Carlo
simulation. Let us consider a reference portfolio with 10’000 loans. All securi-
ties have the same characteristics: identical exposure size, 6% coupon, 1 year to
maturity, 20% default probability, 47.5% recovery rate, and identical exposure
to the macro factor, corresponding to a correlation of ρM
n =0 .3 between all
securities. All cash ﬂows are discounted with a constant interest rate of 4%.
The evolution of individual-loan credit quality over time is simulated at annual
frequency. Figure 1 shows the loss distribution obtained by Monte Carlo Sim-
ulation with 50’000 simulation runs. The loss distribution has a typical shape
for portfolios subject to credit risk, as it has a substantial positive skewness.
The sensitivity of the individual loans to the macro factor is an important input
parameter determining the shape of the distribution. The higher it is, the more
probability mass is shifted from the middle to the tails of the distribution and
vice versa.
Subsequently, the portfolio is split into seven tranches of strict subordination.
Note that all results reported below remain essentially unchanged if the number
of tranches is changed to, say 5 or to 9 tranches. In practice, the tranches
a r ea s s o c i a t e dw i t hd i ﬀerent ratings by rating agencies. For given maturities
of the tranches, the ratings in turn correspond to speciﬁc default probabilities.
We deﬁne the tranches by a maximum default probability, which is ﬁxed at
the 1%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30% quantile of the loss rate distribution.
Threshold probabilities are round numbers for convenience only. We number
the tranches from 1 to 7, with the seventh tranche being the ﬁrst loss piece, or
equity piece, which covers the residual loss. Tranche no.1, at the other end of
the spectrum, refers to the most senior tranche. All remaining tranches, nos.
2-6, are mezzanine tranches.
Tranching is done with the intention of minimizing the size of the ﬁrst loss
piece, given the number of diﬀerent layers and their respective threshold values.
6Figure 1: Loss distribution of a loan portfolio
This diagram presents the loss distribution of a loan portfolio at maturity. The underlying portfolio
consists of 10’000 securities from diﬀerent obligors. All securities have the same characteristics:
identical exposure size, 6% coupon 1 year to maturity, 20% default probability, 47.5 % recovery
rate, and identical exposure to the macro factor (ρn,M =0 .3). All cash ﬂows are discounted with a
constant interest rate of 4%. The evolution of individual-loan credit quality over time is simulated
at annual frequency. The calculations are performed with 50’000 simulation runs. The horizontal
axis shows the loss rate; the vertical axis shows the observed frequency.
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7Table 1: Summary statistics for tranches
This table presents summary statistics for the seven tranches, representing claims of strict subordi-
nation on the underlying portfolio. The statistics indicate the allocation of losses of the underlying
portfolio to the individual tranches. The cut-oﬀ values for a particular tranche is determined by
the default probability allowed for that tranche as indicated in the ﬁfth column. The most junior
tranche (tranche number 7) corresponds to the ﬁrst loss piece. It bears all losses not covered by
the other, more senior, tranches. The columns present, from left to right, the tranche number, the
tranche size, mean loss, loss standard deviation, default probability, and loss given default. The
last row displays the statistics for the underlying portfolio.
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Applying the loss distribution of the total portfolio leads to the following tranche
sizes starting from the most senior tranche: 0.6161, 0.0370, 0.0554, 0.0514,
0.0602, 0.0393, and 0.1406 for the equity piece. Further summary statistics
for the tranches are provided in Table 1. Graphical representations of the loss
distributions for diﬀerent tranches (senior tranche, mezzanine tranche, and ﬁrst
loss piece) are given in Figure 2.
In Table 1, the senior tranche is by far the largest part of the entire trans-
action, making up 61.61% of the transaction. The expected loss rate is only 7
basis points, while expected loss given a default event is 668 basis points. The
mean loss rate is monotonously increasing in the degree of subordination. Its
maximum value is 60.96% for the equity piece. The default probability of the
equity piece is almost 100%, as there were only 2 out of 50’000 runs in the
simulation that came out with a zero loss rate for the entire portfolio.
The numbers for the senior tranche are particularly striking, as they show
a very low loss given default rate, despite its large size. Figure 2 explains why
this is the case. Realized portfolio losses that surpass the capacities of the
8Figure 2: Loss distribution of tranches
This diagram presents the loss distribution of three tranches (from left to right): the ﬁrst loss piece
(tranche 7), a mezzanine tranche (tranche 6), and the senior tranche (tranche 1). The calculations
are performed with 50’000 simulation runs. The horizontal axis shows the loss rate; the vertical
axis shows the observed frequency, truncated at 30%, 1%, and 0.2%, respectively. There are several
values surpassing these thresholds: For the ﬁrst loss piece, 100% loss occurs at a frequency of 30%.
For the mezzanine tranche, zero loss occurs at a frequency of 70%, and 100% loss occurs at a
frequency of 20%. For the senior tranche, zero loss occurs at a frequency of 99%.
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more subordinate tranches cluster at the low end of possible loss rates, without
any observation exceeding a 25% loss rate in the simulation runs. Clearly, the
distribution of losses in this tranche is sensitive to the extreme-value properties
of the underlying risk factors3.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the most subordinate mezzanine tranche,
no. 6, displays a broad tendency of a downward sloping distribution func-
tion throughout its domain. While the loss rate distributions for all mezzanine
tranches are downward sloping, their slope decreases with the degree of seniority
of the tranche in question for standard portfolio loss distributions and standard
cut-oﬀ values for tranches.
The distribution of the ﬁrst loss piece, depicted in Figure 2, is single peaked
in the interior of its domain, abstracting from the spike at its upper boundary.
This follows from the fact that the lowest tranche comprises two thirds of the
cumulative loss rate distribution, comprising the peak of the aggregate loss rate
distribution.
From the simulation exercise we obtain a couple of insights. By tranching,
the risks of the underlying portfolio are allocated in a non-proportional way
to the tranches. The loan portfolio is transformed into several securities with
entirely diﬀerent risk characteristics. The tranches or only a selection of them,
as is often intended, can subsequently be sold independently to investors. The
senior tranche has the highest quality in all categories. The probability of default
is lowest, with no loss in 99% of all cases in this example. In addition, mean loss,
loss standard deviation, and loss given default are lowest among all tranches.
3This points at a natural extension of our analysis, which uses fat-tailed distributions to
model the loss rate distribution of the underlying loan portfolio.
9Furthermore, the senior tranche is by far the largest of all tranches, with a claim
on 61.61% of the volume of the underlying portfolio. In contrast to the senior
tranche, the ﬁrst loss piece suﬀers a loss rate of 100% with a large probability of
30%. Furthermore, while low losses occur at low frequency, higher losses occur
with an increasing likelihood, peaking at a loss of 22%. Overall, the FLP has the
highest expected loss of all tranches. Finally, the presented statistics illustrate
that even reference portfolios of relatively bad quality (20% default probability
over 1 year for all loans in this case) can be divided into one large tranche of
the highest quality, a couple of mezzanine tranches, and a relatively small ﬁrst
loss piece in which the major proportion of credit risk is concentrated.
3.2 Tranche interdependencies
In this section, we use the data generated in the simulation exercise in order
to investigate the correlation between tranches. Since the underlying structural
model diﬀerentiates between macoeconomic and idiosyncratic risk, we will now
use the risk model presented in the pevious section in order to identify the
exposure of single tranches to the macroeconomic risk factor. The analysis
shows that non-proportional risk sharing allocates macro risk primarily to junior
tranches. In a ﬁrst step, the correlation between tranches of a single issue is
analyzed, e.g, the correlation between the ﬁrst loss piece that is retained on the
bank’s balance sheet and a mezzanine or a senior tranche of the issue. In a second
step, we look at tranches of diﬀerent issues, e.g. the correlation between two
ﬁrst loss pieces, or two senior tranches with distinct underlying asset portfolios.
Since we control the data generating process, we can trace the eﬀect of changes
in the underlying asset correlations to the resulting tranche correlations.
Table 2 displays the bilateral correlations of all CDO tranches (ranging from
senior tranche to the ﬁrst loss piece). The results indicate that tranches of simi-
lar credit quality, or seniority, have higher correlation values than tranches with
diﬀerent credit quality. The correlation between tranches of a given transaction
(CDO 1 in Table 2) decreases monotonically with the distance of quality of two
tranches (or tranche numbers, for that purpose). The correlation of tranche #1,
the senior tranche, with the most junior tranche #7, the equity piece, is 0.0907.
This shows that senior tranches are almost orthogonal to junior tranches, in par-
ticular to the equity piece. Note that even lower correlations can be attained
by increasing the distance of tranches, e.g. by decreasing the maximum default
probability allowed for the senior tranche.
In Table 3, the tranche-correlations of two CDOs with identical characteris-
tics are displayed. The correlation values are the higher the more similar are the
tranches with respect to seniority. The highest correlation values are obtained
for tranches with the same credit quality. These values are close to one. Cor-
respondingly, the lowest bilateral correlation values are obtained for the most
senior and the most junior tranches (0.0906). Note that for large portfolios, the
correlation pattern converges in the limit to that of same-issue tranches (see
Table 2). Correspondingly, if the reference portfolios have less obligors, the
tranche correlations of diﬀerent issues are much lower.
10Table 2: Bilateral correlations of all tranches from one CDO issue
This table displays the bilateral correlations of all CDO tranches ranging from tranche number 1
(most senior tranche) to tranche number 7 (ﬁrst loss piece). The reference portfolio consists of
10’000 loans, and all of them have a default probability of 20%, 1 year maturity, 47.5% recovery
rate, and 6% coupon. All loans are assumed to have a default correlation of 0.3. All cash ﬂows
are discounted with a constant interest rate of 4%. The loss distribution is calculated with 50’000
simulations.
1.0000 Tranche 7
0.6832 1.0000 Tranche 6
0.5047 0.8111 1.0000 Tranche 5
0.3396 0.5457 0.7772 1.0000 Tranche 4
0.2300 0.3697 0.5265 0.7729 1.0000 Tranche 3
0.1483 0.2384 0.3395 0.4984 0.7652 1.0000 Tranche 2
0.0907 0.1458 0.2076 0.3048 0.4680 0.6914 1.0000 Tranche 1 CDO 1
Tranche 7 Tranche 6 Tranche 5 Tranche 4 Tranche 3 Tranche 2 Tranche 1
CDO 1
1.0000 Tranche 7
0.6832 1.0000 Tranche 6
0.5047 0.8111 1.0000 Tranche 5
0.3396 0.5457 0.7772 1.0000 Tranche 4
0.2300 0.3697 0.5265 0.7729 1.0000 Tranche 3
0.1483 0.2384 0.3395 0.4984 0.7652 1.0000 Tranche 2
0.0907 0.1458 0.2076 0.3048 0.4680 0.6914 1.0000 Tranche 1 CDO 1
Tranche 7 Tranche 6 Tranche 5 Tranche 4 Tranche 3 Tranche 2 Tranche 1
CDO 1
11Table 3: Bilateral correlations of tranches from two diﬀerent CDO issues
This table displays the bilateral correlations of all tranches from two diﬀerent CDO issues ranging
from tranche number 1 (most senior tranche) to tranche number 7 (ﬁrst loss piece). Both CDOs
have similar characteristics: The reference portfolios consist of 100 loans, and all of them have an
initial rating of BB, 1 year maturity, 47.5% recovery rate, and 6% coupon. All loans are assumed
to have a default correlation of 0.3. All cash ﬂows are discounted with a constant interest rate of
4%. The loss distribution is calculated with 50’000 simulations.
0.9991 Tranche 7
0.6824 0.9978 Tranche 6
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12According to these simulations, the results conﬁrm that portfolio risk is
transferred to tranches in a non-linear way. In particular, the risk associated
with senior tranches is only to a minor extent correlated with the risk that
remains on the bank’s balance sheet, given the retention of the ﬁrst loss piece.
T h i sr a i s e st h eq u e s t i o nt ow h a te x t e n tt h i sr e s u l td e p e n d so nt h ed i v e r s i ﬁcation
among the assets in the underlying loan portfolio. We turn to this question next.
3.3 Estimating the systematic risk of tranches
The objective of the analysis is to trace the eﬀect of macroeconomic risk to
the risk exposure of individual tranches, structured according to the principle
of subordination. This section has an important result: under quite general as-
sumptions about tranching, the most subordinate tranche has the largest macro-
factor dependency. Tranching therefore tends to increase an issuers systematic
equity risk, provided the most junior tranche is retained, a wide-spread industry
practice. To capture the impact of systematic risk on tranches, we consider a
bond that only depends on the macroeconomic factor and does not exhibit any
idiosyncratic risk. This bond, which we call a macro bond, is assumed to have
otherwise identical characteristics to the bonds in the portfolio, i.e. 1 year to
maturity, 6% coupon, 20% default rate, and 47.5% recovery rate. The macro
bond allows us to estimate directly the relationship between the macro risk fac-
tor and the realizations of particular tranches of an underlying loan portfolio.
In our setting of normally distributed realizations, the default rate of 20% cor-
responds to a default boundary of -0.8416 according to the distribution function
of (macro bond) value realizations Vn,t in Eq. (1), where ρM
n is set equal to one.
Table 4 summarizes the results, comparing joint default events of the tranches
and the macro bond. The second column reports the unconditional default rates
of the tranches, as speciﬁed for the simulation in this paper. The third column
reports the default rate of the tranche conditional on the default of the macro
bond. This conditional tranche default rate is monotonic in the tranche quality,
leading to the highest value of 100% for the most junior tranche, and to 4.95%
for the most senior tranche. Note that these conditional default probailities are
almost four times higher than the unconditional probabilities for tranches 1 to
5.
The fourth column speciﬁes the conditional macro bond default rate, i.e. the
probability of a macro bond default, given the default of a particular tranche.
This conditional default rate is 100% for all senior tranches, and gradually
decreases for junior tranches. For the ﬁrst loss piece, the conditional default
rate is lowest, with a value of 20.15% in our simulation.
The results in Table 4 show that the impact of macro risk on the default
rates of tranches varies systematically with the rating quality of the tranche.
According to the last column, the more senior a tranche is, the more likely is
its default accompanied by a negative realization of the macro risk factor.
Figure 3 relates tranche losses to realizations of the macro factor. The ﬁrst
loss piece suﬀers losses even for very good realizations of the macro factor. The
capacity of the ﬁrst loss piece is exhausted already for macro factor realizations
13Table 4: The eﬀect of systematic risk on tranches
This table presents the eﬀect of systematic risk on tranches. All loans are assumed to have a default
correlation of 0.3, a default probability of 20%, 1 year maturity, 47.5% recovery rate, and 6% coupon.
All cash ﬂows are discounted with a constant interest rate of 4%. The calculations are performed
with 50’000 simulation runs. The ﬁrst column shows the tranches considered, ranging from 1 (most
senior tranche) to 7 (ﬁrst loss piece). The second column reports the unconditional default rates of
the tranches. The third column reports the default rate of each tranche conditional on the default
of a bond only subject to macroeconomic risk. The fourth column speciﬁes the probability of a
macro bond default, given the default of a particular tranche.
100.00%
100.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
5.00%
2.00%
1.00%
Pd(tranche)
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
98.42%
49.61%
24.80%
9.92%
4.95%
Pd(tranche | macro)
20.15% Total portfolio
20.15% 7
67.21% 6
99.22% 5
100.00% 4
100.00% 3
100.00% 2
100.00% 1
Pd(macro | tranche) Tranche
100.00%
100.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
5.00%
2.00%
1.00%
Pd(tranche)
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
98.42%
49.61%
24.80%
9.92%
4.95%
Pd(tranche | macro)
20.15% Total portfolio
20.15% 7
67.21% 6
99.22% 5
100.00% 4
100.00% 3
100.00% 2
100.00% 1
Pd(macro | tranche) Tranche
around the 30 percent quantile. For lower realizations, the losses of the ﬁrst
loss piece are truncated at its share of the reference portfolio, corresponding to
a loss of 100 percent. In constrast to the ﬁrst loss piece, the senior tranche only
suﬀers losses in the case of extremely bad realizations of the macro factor. Note
that the senior tranche even in the worst case only suﬀers minor losses although
it has by far the largest size of all tranches. This is due to the recovery that
truncates losses of the senior tranche.
We now turn to the estimation of a central measure of tranche interdepen-
dency on a market, which is beta, the systematic risk of individual tranches.
This measure of risk is used in portfolio theory to capture the degree of pro-
cyclicality of two random variables. A beta value larger (smaller) than one
characterizes a return series that exhibits more (less) cyclical variation then the
benchmark index. In calculating tranche betas we take the macro factor Y t
M as
the benchmark index. Table 5 shows the sensitivity of the individual tranches
to the macro risk factor. In particular, the realized tranche returns obtained in
the simulation runs are regressed on the macro risk factor. The estimated betas
increase monotonically with the level of subordination, indicating that the ﬁrst
loss piece has a high sensitivity to the macro risk factor while the most senior
tranche almost has none. Thus, with tranches being exposed to diﬀerent degrees
of systematic risk, also the exposure of the issuing institution to systematic risk
changes in the practically relevant case that not all tranches are sold.
14Figure 3: Tranche sensitivity to macro factor
This ﬁgure shows the sensitivity of individual tranches to realizations of the macro factor. The
tranche numbers range from 1 (senior tranche) to 7 (equity piece). The vertical axis shows the loss
rate with respect to the reference portfolio. The vertical axis shows the quantiles of macro factor
realizations. High quantiles indicate good states of the economy.
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15Table 5: Tranche beta
This table presents the results from a regression relating tranche returns to the corresponding
realizations of the macroeconomic factor. All loans are assumed to have a default correlation of 0.3,
a default probability of 20%, 1 year maturity, 47.5% recovery rate, and 6% coupon. All cash ﬂows
are discounted with a constant interest rate of 4%. The calculations are performed with 50’000
simulation runs. The ﬁrst column shows the tranches considered, ranging from 1 (most senior
tranche) to 7 (ﬁrst loss piece). The second column reports the alpha values and the third column
reports beta values of the regression r = α + β ∗ YM +  .
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164 Implications for Bank Risk
In this section, we investigate the risk position of a bank that issues a CDO,
assuming that it retains the ﬁrst loss piece, the most junior tranche. We make
this assumption since it is believed to be common practice among international
banks. We have no direct evidence supporting this assumption and therefore
refer to survey results (See ECB 2004 and Bundesbank 2004). This section shows
that under fairly general assumptions concerning bank reinvestment behavior,
risk transfer will simultaneously decrease its exposure vis-à-vis extreme risks
and increase its overall macro-factor dependence. We therefore predict issuing
banks to increase their equity beta.
4.1 Securitization and reinvestment
We now investigate the risk position of a bank that issues CDOs. Typically,
a bank is exposed to various types of risk, in particular market risk, credit
risk, and operational risk. Market risk is often deﬁned as outcomes from po-
sition taking (stock, interest-sensitive securities, foreign exchange) as well as
customer-related activities (fees and provision). Credit risk incurs from lending
which generates fees and interest income. Finally, operational risk as deﬁned
by the Basle Committee are losses due to external events and failure of internal
processes, people, or systems. The distributions of all mentioned sources of risk
have distinct characteristics. Market risk is typically assumed to have a sym-
metric distribution with a high variance, operational risk is typically assumed
to have a very thin distribution with large tails, and credit risk is assumed to
have a skewed distribution with limited gains, but unlimited loss potential. On
average, the banks’ exposure to credit risk is about 6.5 times higher than to
market risk, as obtained by [19], and thus the distribution of credit risk has
a dominating impact on the overall risk distribution of a bank. What is the
resulting risk position of a bank that actively securitizes its loan portfolio?
The impact of securitization on overall bank risk crucially depends on how
the proceeds are reinvested. The resulting eﬀect is not obvious as there is a whole
range of possiblilties. In the extreme case on the one side, the balance sheet
of the bank risk is levered, either by distributing the proceeds to shareholders
or by entering new investments with similar risk characteristics as the retained
junior tranche. In the other extreme, overall bank risk also can decrease with
a securitization transaction. This is the case when the proceeds are invested in
new projects with lower risk. Thus, depending on the new risk position following
securitization and re-investment, a bank will have to hold more or less equity
according the capital accords of the Basle committee. Seen from a dynamic
perspective, the bank will either be exposed more or less to the ﬂuctuations of
the overall economy. Thus, while the Basle 2 accords have pro-cyclical eﬀects,
securitization (and re-investment) allows to inﬂuence a bank’s risk sensitivity to
the overall economy and thereby the capital requirements. Thus, securitization
allows banks to pursue its lending business independently of the state of the
economy, in spite of cyclical eﬀects imposed by the Basle 2 regulation.
17Figure 4: Loss distribution of a loan portfolio after repeated securitizations and
reinvestments
This ﬁgure shows the loss distribution of a loan portfolio after repeated securitizations and rein-
vestments. The original portfolio is securitized by retaining a ﬁrst loss piece of 14.06 percent. The
proceeds obtained from the securitized portion (85.94 percent of the initial portfolio) amount to
94.26 percent of the total portfolio value as obtained with a one-factor asset pricing model. This
amount is reinvested in a new portfolio consisting of identical loans. Loss distributions are shown
for several iterations ranging from zero (the original portfolio is kept) to inﬁnity (the limit case).
The horizontal axis shows the loss incurred with respect to the initial portfolio value, determined
with a one-factor asset pricing model. Negative values indicate excess returns. The vertical axis
shows the frequency of relative losses.
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18To determine the resulting risk position of a bank that actively securitizes
its loan portfolio, we investigate the special case of a bank that repeatedly
securitizes its loan portfolio and reinvests the proceeds. It turns out that a
bank that repeatedly securitizes its loan portfolio and reinvests the proceeds
will have an entirely diﬀerent risk position after these transactions. With each
iteration, the bank increases its leverage. Figure 4 shows the credit risk exposure
of a bank that repeatedly securitizes its loan portfolio, retains the ﬁrst loss piece
and reinvests the proceeds in loans of the same quality characteristics in terms
of loss distribution. We start out from a simulated loss distribution obtained for
a benchmark portfolio with 10’000 individual loans and 1 year to maturity. The
default probability of the loans in the portfolio is 20%, and the recovery rate
in case of default is 47.5%. Applying the Monte Carlo Simulation technique to
this portfolio leads to the distribution of the original portfolio. The obtained
average loss rate is 11.07% with a standard deviation of 8.93%.
After every round of securitizing and reinvesting, the resulting relative loss
distribution of the bank changes with the number of iterations and takes a dis-
tinct shape, diﬀering from that traditionally assumed for credit risk exposures.
This has important implications for ﬁrm-wide risk management of the bank.
Repeated securitization and reinvestment uniformly increases the return vari-
ance of the securitizing bank and the value- a t - r i s k .T h es p e c i a lc a s eo fi d e n t i c a l
loss rate distribution for the initial loan portfolio and all new (reinvested) loan
portfolios has a simple limit result: the loss distribution of the portfolio with
repeated reinvestment converges to that of the original ﬁrst loss piece. However,
even a small number of iterations transforms the bank’s loss rate distribution
substantially, reducing its skewness and increasing its mean value. Already after
one round, mean loss rate and standard deviation increase substantially and take
the values 18.09% and 12.07%, respectively. The limit distribution has a mean
loss rate of 60.96% and a standard deviation of 34.28%, while the probability
of a complete asset loss is 30% (compared to 0.00% in the original portfolio).
This latter number is also the probability that the bank goes bankrupt provided
that it is completely equity ﬁnanced and has no additional income from sources
other than lending. The results are important for bank risk management and
regulation likewise.
4.2 Estimating the eﬀect of granularity
In this section, we investigate the eﬀect of increasing granularity on the standard
deviation of the asset portfolio. We will trace the eﬀect of diversiﬁcation on the
average correlation by varying the number of assets (loans) in the underlying
p o o l . W ec a r r yo u tt h i sb a s i ct e s t ,b e c a u s ew ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h ee ﬀect of
securitization on diversiﬁcation. One hypothesis advanced in the literature is
that a bank that engages in the transfer of risk through tranching increases
the diversiﬁcation in its asset base. The reason is that the proceeds from a
securitization can be reinvested in new loans, thereby increasing the granularity
of the loan book.
We consider a reference portfolio with a varying number of loans. All loans
19Table 6: The eﬀect of portfolio diversiﬁcation
This table presents, for three correlation scenarios, the standard deviation of losses for diﬀerent
numbers of loans. The numbers in parentheses indicate the reduction factor of the standard de-
viation obtained when increasing the number of loans in the portfolio by the factor 10. In the
three correlation scenarios, all loans are assumed to have a default correlation of 0.0, 0.15, and 0.3,
respectively. All loans have a default probability of 20%, 1 year to maturity, 47.5% recovery rate,
and 6% coupon. All cash ﬂows are discounted with a constant interest rate of 4%. The calculations
for the diﬀerent portfolios are performed with 50’000 simulation runs each.
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have a default probability of 20%, 1 year to maturity, 47.5% recovery rate, and
6% coupon. Table 6 presents the standard deviation of losses after accounting
for the number of loans. All loans are assumed to have a default correlation
of 0.0 and 0.3, respectively. The calculations for the diﬀerent portfolios are
performed with 50’000 simulation runs each.
The results suggest that even a small number of loans in a portfolio is enough
to diversify away the major part of idiosyncratic default risk. Consider the
ﬁrst column. The asset base is assumed to consist of uncorrelated risks, and
the idiosyncratic risk (standard deviation) is 22.13%. If the number of loans
increases, the standard deviation of the portfolio loss rates is rapidly decreasing,
approaching zero. For example, with an asset base of 1000 loans, the resulting
portfolio standard deviation is reduced by 1 − 0.7
22.13 =9 6 .84 percent, relative
to the original level, the standard deviation of the loss rate distribution of a
single loan. As can be seen from columns 2 and 3, the decrease in standard
deviation is a function of the bi-variate correlation between assets. For instance,
if the correlation is 0.3, an asset base of 1000 loans reduces portfolio standard
deviation to 8.98% of its original level. This number, however, is numerically
close to portfolio standard deviation that can be reached when the asset base
is decreased by a factor of 10. In this case, the resulting standard deviation
is 9.19%, i.e. increases the standard deviation by a factor of 1.023 (+2.3%).
Put diﬀerently, increasing the granularity of a portfolio has only a minor eﬀect
20on portfolio standard deviation, provided the number of loans in the initial
portfolio exceeds 100. This exponential phasing out of the granularity eﬀect
happens earlier (i.e. with a small number of loans in the initial portfolio) if
the bi-variate loan correlation is high. For lower correlations, the phasing out
happens at higher degrees of granularity, but the overall eﬀect is already close
to complete with merely 100 assets. The exception is a bi-variate correlation of
0.0, where the reduction of standard deviation for each increase of the number
of loans by the factor 10, can be approximated by a constant factor, 3.1 in our
simulations.
Overall, the results demonstrate that the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts are rapidly
decreasing with the number of securities in the portfolio. Typically, banks hold
very large loan portfolios and the securitization of a bank’s loan book will only
marginally increase asset granularity. Thus, contrary to what is often believed,
securitizing a bank loan portfolio with subsequent reinvestment in new loans
will only have minor additional diversiﬁcation beneﬁts for banks.
4.3 Implications for bank beta
We now examine the eﬀect of securitization on the exposure of banks to system-
atic risk. In particular, how does bank equity beta change in connection with a
securitization transaction? For simplicity, we assume that a bank is only pursu-
ing a lending business and that it has no other assets than its loan portfolio. On
the other hand, the liabilities comprise equity and debt. We now examine how
a bank’s beta changes with securitization, assuming that the bank securitizes
its entire loan portfolio.
In line with the results obtained in Table 5,w ea s s u m et h a tt h e r ei sa
monotonous relation between the beta of a tranche and its seniority, and that
the following inequality holds:
βFLP >β
orig
PF = β
orig
assets,
where βFLP is the beta of the ﬁrst loss piece and β
orig
PF is the beta of the original
reference portfolio.4
Generally, a bank’s asset- and equity-beta can be related by the following
equation:
βassets = βdebt · d + βequity · e, (4)
where βassets, βdebt,a n dβequity are the betas of the assets, debt, and equity,
respectively. The debt ratio is denoted by d, and the equity ratio is denoted by
e.
The relation between original and new bank equity beta can be expressed in
a general way by using Eq. 4:
4Our simulation results show that the monotonous relation between the beta of a tranche
and its seniority applies in all practically relevant cases. However, at this point, a formal proof
of this assumption is left to the reader.
21∆βequity = β
new
equity − β
orig
equity
=
β
new
assets
enew −
β
orig
assets
eorig −
β
new
debt · dnew
enew +
β
orig
debt · dorig
eorig , (5)
where eorig (dorig) is the original and enew (dnew) is the new equity (debt)
ratio after securitization.
The new asset beta β
new
assets depends on how the securitization proceeds are
reinvested, i.e. which sensitivities the new securities have to the macroeconomic
risk factor. Let s denote the securitization proceeds in percent of the original
portfolio. Correspondingly, the percentage of the retained ﬁrst loss piece is
equal to 1 − s. Reinvestment also implies the possibility to pay out part of the
securitization proceeds to equity- or debtholders. Let the ratio of total payout
to total assets be represented by h. Thus, the new proportion of funds to be
reinvested is s∗ ≡ s−h
1−h, while the proportion of the ﬁrst loss piece in the new
portfolio is 1 − s∗ ≡ 1−s
1−h. Accounting for possible payout to equity- or debt-
holders, the new ratio s∗ of reinvested funds. The new asset beta is then given
by:
β
new
assets =( 1− s∗) · βFLP + s∗ · β
reinvest. (6)
By combining Eq. 5 and 6, we obtain a general formula for the relation
between original and new bank equity beta after securitization5:
∆βequity =
(1 − s∗) · βFLP + s∗ · β
reinvest
enew −
β
orig
assets
eorig −
β
new
debt · dnew
enew +
β
orig
debt · dorig
eorig ,
(7)
Thus, magnitude and direction of equity beta change depend on bank lever-
age before and after securitization as well as the beta of the reinvestment al-
ternative chosen. Figure 5 shows in two panels the change in bank equity beta
after a securitization transaction. The left diagram shows how equity beta
changes in response to diﬀerent leverage, given a constant beta of reinvested
assets β
reinvest = β
orig
assets. The plot shows that, for constant leverage, for in-
creasing leverage, and even for to some extent decreasing leverage, β
new
equity is
larger than β
orig
equity. The right diagram shows how equity beta changes in re-
sponse to diﬀerent beta of reinvested assets, given a constant equity ratio of 0.1
which is typical in the banking sector. The plot shows that equity beta rises
in most cases and only decreases if the beta of reinvested assets is substantially
below the beta of the original portfolio. Thus, we conclude that equity beta may
rise or fall in response to a securitization transaction, but in most practically
relevant cases, it will rise.
5Note that payouts may have any eﬀect on ﬁrm leverage, ranging from an increase to a
decrease, depending on how the payouts are distributed between equity- and debt-holders.
Equally, ﬁrm leverage may also change without any payouts due to balance sheet restructur-
ings.
22Figure 5: Bank equity beta change after securitization
This ﬁgure shows change of bank equity beta after securitization for various values of ﬁrm leverage
(panel a) and beta of reinvested assets (panel b). The beta of debt is set to zero. The ﬁrst loss
piece has a share of 14.06 percent of the total portfolio. The beta of the original portfolio as well
as the reinvested securities is 0.0846, the beta of the ﬁrst loss piece is 0.3200, the original and the
new equity ratios are 0.1, corresponding to typical values for banks. In panel a, the new equity
ratio is varied (vertical axis), in panel b, the beta of the reinvested securities is varied (x-axis). In
panel a, there is a positive (negative) change in equity beta for equity ratios smaller (larger) than
0.139. In panel b, there is a positive (negative) change in equity beta for a weighted average beta
of reinvested securities larger (smaller) than 0.046. Leaving both ﬁrm leverage and portfolio beta
of reinvested securities constant, the resultung equity beta change of the bank is 0.3310.
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It is worth noting that there is a substantial diﬀerence between synthetic and
true sale transactions with respect to the change in equity beta. The argument
as outlined above, i.e. that beta may rise or fall in response to a securitization
transaction, holds for true sale transactions. In the case of synthetic transac-
tions, however, the argument changes: Since all claims are settled at maturity,
there are no immediate cash ﬂows from the transaction that can be reinvested
in new securities or distributed to equity- or debt-holders. Consequently, in the
case of synthetic transactions, there will always be an increase in equity beta.
The analysis presented in this paper builds on a one-factor macroeconomic
risk model. In extended versions with several independent risk factors, the
results remain essentially unchanged. There are only more sensitivities and
beta changes that have to be considered, each likewise represented by Eq. 7.
5S y s t e m i c R i s k
In the last section we have established that under certain conditions relating to
the retention of ﬁrst loss pieces, the securitization of a loan portfolios by a bank
will lead to an increase in its exposure to market risk. We found the increase
of the issuing institution’s systematic risk to be positively related to the size of
the retained equity piece, and to the reinvestment beta of the issue proceeds.
Beta always increases for synthetic issues, since there are no issue proceeds.
23All these claims pertain to the individual bank. What do they imply for
the banking sector as a whole? On the basis of the simple risk transfer model
introduced in this paper, we now estimate the correlation of defaults. This
corresponds to a widely used deﬁnition of systemic risk, the likelihood of a
concurrent failure of several banks, see Kaufman (2000) or Lehar (2005).6 For
any given joint loss rate distribution, one can determine the cumulative density
of a certain number n or more banks defaulting simultaneously. This will be
our approach to capture system-wide default risks, and we will investigate the
relationship between systematic risk exposure on the level of the individual bank
and its contribution to the risk of multiple bank failures.
5.1 How securitization aﬀects joint default probabilities
The previous section has concluded that the securitization of a bank’s loan
portfolio combined with the retention of a junior claim on the asset pool, tends
to raise the bank’s equity beta. Therefore one may ask: What is the marginal
eﬀect of such a beta rise on the likelihood of multiple bank failure? To answer
this question we run a Monte Carlo simulation with many banks, all modeled as
in section 4. We let one bank securitize its loan portfolio, tranching the portfolio
according to the rules outlined in section 3, selling all tranches except the most
subordinate one, and reinvesting the proceeds in assets of a similar quality as
the securitized loan portfolio7.
Table 7 shows, for a market consisting of 5 banks, the probability that a
certain number of banks default. In the base case of no securitization, i.e. all
banks holding on to their original loan portfolios, the probability of at least one
bank defaulting amounts to 42.13% while the probability that all banks default
amounts to 39.88%. Thus, in the majority of all cases, either all banks or no
bank will default.8
Table 7 compares the performance of banks and shows the probabilities of
at least 1, 2, ..., 5 banks defaulting simultaneously. The numbers reported
are cumulative probabilities. The ﬁrst column shows the base case, when no
bank securitizes its loan portfolio. In this case, the probability of just one bank
6Kaufman (2000) surveys the many diﬀerent deﬁnitions of systemic risk used in the liter-
ature. These deﬁnitions have received considerable attention, probably because the contain-
ment of systemic risk is one of the core justiﬁcations for banking supervision, and for central
bank interventions in ﬁnancial markets.
7The assumption that new loans have similar characteristics as the old loans is for ease of
exposition only. In section 4, it was shown that the change in macro factor exposure has the
predicted same sign as long as the reinvestment beta is not too much smaller than the beta
of the original loan portfolio. So, for instance, the re-investment of ABS proceeds in riskless
government bonds could actually lower the issuing banks equity beta. If this is the case, the
eﬀect on systemic risk is the other way around.
8Note that the number of bank defaults is dominated by the realization of the macro factor
in this example. The dominance of macro factor realizations is due to (1) the large size of the
loan portfolios with 10000 loans each and (2) the rather high correlation assumption of 0.3
between all loans. However, our calculations for more realistic average correlations show that
the numbers do not change much. Still, realizations of the macro factor dominate the results,
i.e. in the majority of all cases, either all banks or no bank default.
24defaulting is 42,13%, in line with the high individual default probability assumed
in these simulations (see section 4 for details). Changing the individual default
probabilities will downshift the numbers in column 1 as well. The second column
reports the eﬀect of one securitizing bank on the joint default probabilities of
1,...,5 banks. There is a uniform increase in system-wide joint default probability
for the diﬀerent levels of joint default in Table 7. The third column assumes
that all ﬁve banks engage in one round of asset securitization. The numbers
in the table indicate that securitization increases the risk of joint bank defaults
at each level, represented by the minimum number of banks jointly defaulting.
While the probability that at least one bank defaults is 42.13% if all banks hold
on to the original loan portfolio, the default probability increases to 56.05% if all
banks sell oﬀ their loan portfolios, retaining the ﬁrst-loss piece, and reinvest the
proceeds in new loans. Similar increases can be observed for all other levels of
systemic risk, i.e. that at least 2, 3, 4, or 5 banks default. Correspondingly, the
probability of a joint default of all ﬁve banks rises by 14.15 percentage points
in comparison to the base case of no securitization and reaches 54.03%.
The results reported in Table 7 support the claim that asset securitization
may increase the systematic risk exposure of these banks. Furthermore, the risk
transfer by even a single ﬁnancial institution will contribute to an increase of
the systemic risk of the banking sector. Note that the source of systemic risk in
our model is not contagion, or any other inter-bank liability, but the impact of
a common macroeconomic factor in the return generating process9. The reason
why securitization levers macroeconomic risk has been shown in this and the
previous section: it is the inﬂuence that securitization (or structured funding in
general) exerts on the systematic risk of the bank’s asset composition. In our
simulations, this inﬂuence is due to a) the retention of the most subordinate
tranche, and b) to the characteristics of the reinvestment decision concerning
the generated new funds.
Overall, these results show how the mechanics of tranching and securitization
relate to systemic risk, providing a framework for more precise regulation.
5.2 Inferring systemic risk from market betas
In the previous section, we have shown that by the use of collateralized debt
obligations, based on the mechanics of tranching and securitization, banks may
increase their systematic risk, and thereby may raise the stability risk of the
ﬁnancial system at large. We have captured the bank’s macro factor exposure
by beta, the bank return’s standardized covariance with the volatility of the
market index. We now turn our approach on its head and analyze whether or
not a change of a bank’s equity beta is an indicator of an increased systemic
banking risk. This question is important, since an aﬃrmative answer would give
us an easy-to-use instrument at hand that allows the monitoring of joint bank
default rates, or synonymously, systemic risk. On the other hand, the question
9In the recent literature on systemic bank risk, there is an emphasis on inter-bank ﬁnancial
relationships as the main source of systemic risk, see De Bandt and Hartmann (2002) for a
survey.
25Table 7: Multiple bank defaults
This table shows the probability of multiple bank defaults. The examined market consists of 5
banks holding loan portfolios from diﬀerent obligors, but with otherwise identical characteristics.
The given numbers are probabilities that at least a certain number of banks in the market default.
The default probabilities are given for three scenarios: (1) no bank securitizes, i.e. all banks hold
on to their original loan portfolios, (2) one bank securitizes its loan portfolio, retaining the ﬁrst-loss
piece and reinvesting the proceeds, and (3) all banks securitize their loan portfolios.
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56.05% 42.13% 1
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is not trivial, because it is conceivable that a) securitizations lead to increased
systematic and systemic risk, as shown in sections 4 and 5, and b) both eﬀects
are actually a consequence of the bank retaining the highly risky ﬁrst loss piece
of the securitization. Thus, the increase in systemic risk reported earlier, may
be due to the speciﬁc risk allocation achieved in structured ﬁnance, but it may
n o tb ec a u s e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nb e t ai t s e l f .T op u ti td i ﬀerently, in this section
we will analyze whether an increase in beta will always increase the joint default
probability of banks, independent of the reason for the shift in beta.
Table 7 reports the results of a Monte Carlo simulation with ﬁve banks, all
of which have the same characteristics (equity ratio of 10%, default probability
of 10%, and equal betas). However, in contrast to earlier simulations, we do not
assume anything about securitization and reinvestment. Instead, we model the
bank as a return generating entity with a given macro risk exposure, summarized
by its beta value. We look at three distinct scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, all
banks have a zero macro factor exposure, i.e. each individual beta is equal to
zero. Results are in col.1 of Table 7.
We ﬁnd a rapid decay in the probability of joint bank defaults for higher
numbers of banks involved. Thus, the probability of one bank or more failing
is 40.55%, while it is 7.96% for two or more and 0.05% for 4 or 5 banks failing
jointly. If we increase beta uniformly to the level of 1, the probabilities for
more than one bank failure is rising for all levels of systemic crisis, relative to
the base case in col.1. Only the probability of just one bank failure is reduced,
indicating that probability mass is shifted from independent default occurrence
to joint defaults. If beta is increased further, to the uniform level of 2, we ﬁnd
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This table shows the probability of multiple bank defaults. The examined market consists of 5
banks holding loan portfolios from diﬀerent obligors, but with otherwise identical characteristics.
The given numbers are probabilities that at least a certain number of banks in the market default.
The default probabilities are given for three scenarios with diﬀerent bank equity betas. The tuples
in the ﬁrst row indicate the equity-beta values of each of the 5 banks in the market.
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even higher systemic risk, i.e., the likelihood of multiple bank failures rises at
all levels. Here again, the probability of a single bank failure is reduced, due to
increased macro factor dependence. Thus, a unanimous increase in equity beta
for all banks leads to a higher probability of multiple bank defaults.
Summing up, we we showed how bank equity betas relate to the probability
of multiple bank defaults. In particular, we ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that
individual bank equity betas are an important statistic for multiple bank failure
risk.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper traces the eﬀect of a ﬁnancial innovation on the risk proﬁle of an
individual bank, and more generally on the stability of the banking sector.
The ﬁnancial innovation we are looking at is the securitization of the loan book.
Throughout the paper, we employ numerical methods, which allows us to closely
examine the nature of risk transfer.
The key ﬁnding in this paper is a positive relationship between subordi-
nation and macro factor dependence. We ﬁnd senior tranches to have a low
correlation with the macrofactor, while junior tranches have substantial posi-
tive correlation, far higher than the underlying asset portfolio itself. This result
implies that under plausible conditions concerning the properties of the under-
lying credit assets and the retention of the ﬁrst loss piece, the systematic risk of
the issuing bank, as measured by its equity beta, will rise. To derive this result
we have projected the portfolio default rate of individual tranches on a macro
risk factor, which in turn served to generate the returns of the individual loans,
27together with an idiosyncratic risk factor. We also show that the risk position
of a bank that securitizes its loan portfolio and reinvests the proceeds diﬀers
substantially from commonly used credit loss distributions. Furthermore, we
simulate the dependency between tranches of diﬀerent transactions, but with
the same risk rating. The correlation coeﬃcients tend to be highest for the
most senior tranches. The reason for this is the joint dependency on the market
interest rate, or the term structure of interest rates, but not their dependency
on the macro risk factor (which was shown earlier to be negligible).
The interpretation of the macro risk factor as market risk invites an empir-
ical test of our hypothesis, namely that credit securitizations contribute to an
increase in the systematic risk of banks10.I fc o n ﬁrmed, this would imply that
the banking industry increases its dependence on the macro risk factor by secu-
ritizing its asset pool. From the point of view of a regulator, an increased macro
risk dependence of individual banks also raises the probability of joint defaults.
This, however, raises the likelihood of observing a banking crisis - many ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries failing at the same time. In our setting, the commonality is
due to a high dependency of banks on general macroeconomic conditions, which
implies that banks tend to suﬀer large loan losses at the same time.
Our simulations suggest that credit backed securitizations render banks more
vulnerable against adverse movements of the macroeconomic factor. This con-
clusion is subject to the retention of the ﬁrst loss piece, while mezzanine and
senior tranches are sold to outside investors. A more aggressive risk acquisition
by issuing banks would make our results even stronger, see Acharya (2001) and
Instefjord (2005).
Note that the increased dependency of ﬁrst loss banks (i.e. banks that keep
securitizing their loan portfolio while retaining the ﬁr s tl o s sp i e c e )o nm a c r o
r i s k sg o e sh a n di nh a n dw i t ha ne ﬀective transfer of extreme systematic risks.
These latter risks are realized if several banks fail at the same time, and the
severity of these losses is then borne by the holders of the senior tranches. The
transfer of extreme systematic risk stabilizes the banking system, while the
banks’ systematic risk rise nevertheless.
Doesn’t the new rules known as Basel II solve the problem of systematic
risk increase through an increase in minimum equity capital? Under Bael II
regulation, the holder of an equity tranche has to hold 100% equity against
this position. One can therefore conclude that as long as the minimum capital
requirement is binding, an increase in asset beta through securitization will be
balanced oﬀ by a lower debt ratio. However, empirically we observe a trend for
banks in many countries, and in particular for internationally active banks, to
increase their eﬀective equity capital far above the minimum capital requirement
(see Allen et al., 2005, for a survey and an explanation of this development),
thereby rendering the above formulation invalid: when minimum capital re-
quirement is not binding, then the issue of credit backed securities (retaining
the junior tranche) will most likely increase bank equity beta.
Furthermore, as worked out in section 5, the increase of systematic bank
10This is the subject of a companion paper, Hänsel/Krahnen (in preparation).
28equity risk in the wake of risk transfer through securitized loan assets aﬀects
the correlation among diﬀerent ﬁnancial institutions. The joint dependency is
what beta is intended to capture after all. Therefore, we have concluded that
securitization not only raises systematic bank risk, but it also raises systemic
risk of the entire banking sector. There are three questionable assumptions
that underlie our conclusion. First, why should the most subordinate tranche
of a securitization transaction be retained? Second, are there any compensat-
ing eﬀects in other segments of the ﬁnancial system that oﬀset the increase in
systemic risk? Third, are beta values truly useful if one wants to forecast the
stability of a ﬁnancial system vis-à-vis exogenous macroeconomic shocks? We
will deal with these questions in turn.
Equity piece retention is widely observed in the industry, according to sur-
vey evidence published by the Bundesbank (2004), and by the European Central
Bank (2004). What is the economic function of the retention of ﬁrst loss pieces?
The question has been analyzed in the theoretical literature by Plantin (2004),
and by DeMarzo (2005). These authors show that the retention of a ﬁrst loss
piece serves the purpose of a deductible in insurance markets, aligning the incen-
tives of the issuing bank with the interests of the buyers of the senior tranches.
Thus, ﬁrst loss piece retention is all the more important, the stronger is the role
of relationship lending in the pool of securitized assets. Arm’s length lending, in
contrast, is less likely to require any deductible in order to be sold on the market
place. Thus, we expect our line of argument from securitization to systemic risk
to be notably relevant for commercial banks with large midcap industry loans
and private relationship lending.
T h es e c o n dq u e s t i o nr e a l l yd e s c r i b e sa no p e nr e s e a r c hq u e s t i o n . I fs e c u r i -
tizations in the banking sector raise average beta of the sector, there must be
a compensating eﬀect elsewhere in the economy, since average beta equals one
by construction. The relevant question is therefore whether the oﬀsetting eﬀect
happens within the ﬁnancial system, or outside of the system. The latter case
may be due to a decreasing beta of household assets, which were bank bonds
before securitization, and are senior CDO tranches afterwards. There are clearly
a great many possible compensating eﬀects that need further study.
There may be additional reasons to believe that a bank that securitizes
its liabilities will end up increasing asset risk. One powerful argument has
been made by Acharya (2001), who endogenizes the choice of correlation risk
by banks. Acharya (2001) shows that depending on the capital requirements
imposed on banks, they may ﬁnd it attractive to increase correlation risk, due
to moral hazard. A good example is a pertinent bank regulation that focuses
on the individual default risk of banks (Value at Risk, for example), neglecting
correlation risk. In such a case, banks will become creative in order to raise the
unpriced correlation risk. Of course, and as shown before, one way of achieving
increased correlation risk is through securitizing assets. The current reform of
banking regulation, Basel II, does not address the correlation risk, and therefore
illustrates well the point raised by Acharya (2001).
What are the lessons for ﬁnancial stability supervision? First, the eﬀect
of credit risk transfer on banks’ systematic risk can be estimated using either
29numerical models, or using empirical data. In both cases regulators will want
to hold average bank beta at level compatible with banks’ capital reserves.
Since non-proportional risk sharing is increasingly used not only in the bank-
ing industry, but also in corporate ﬁnance and in the reinsurance industry, we
expect our analysis to have relevance even beyond the ﬁeld of credit risk man-
agement. Overall, the analysis stresses the importance for both investors, banks,
and regulators to better understand the risk allocation in securitization trans-
actions.
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